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Last November Advocated General (AG) Jääskinen finally addressed, in a much-
awaited legal opinion,1 the UK’s challenge to the so-called bankers’ bonuses ‘cap’ 
under EU capital requirements legislation (Directive 2013/36/EU (‘CRD IV’) and 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (‘CRR’)).2 The AG suggested to the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (the Court) that the action be dismissed. This, it appears, will be 
the final word on the matter. Following the opinion’s release, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer announced that he would drop the action before the Court.3  
Besides the disagreement on how to regulate bankers’ bonuses, the judicial 
challenge also reflected the UK’s discontent – already obvious in its challenge to 
Article 28 of the short selling regulation4 – with losing authority to the EU on matters 
of importance to the UK. The AG’s opinion is noteworthy for turning a common 
policy argument against the CRD IV bonuses ‘cap’ somehow on its head. The 
argument in question is that the CRD IV provisions on bonuses (or more precisely, 
the provisions on the variable component of the total remuneration) will merely serve 
to push up the fixed component of the total remuneration and that therefore the EU’s 
action on bonuses is simply inadequate.5 I will begin by introducing the basic points 
of contention, even though I will not examine all of the UK’s submissions.  
At stake were a number of provisions of the CRD IV and the CRR which the 
UK asked the Court to annul. In short, the provisions in question (i) establish a ratio 
between the fixed and variable components of the total remuneration of certain 
employees in financial institutions (the so-called bonuses ‘cap’); (ii) vest in this 
context the European Banking Authority (EBA) with the task of specifying certain 
requirements by way of draft technical standards and; (iii) establish certain disclosure 
obligations regarding remuneration practices. The UK made the following 
submissions: it disagreed with the choice of the Treaty legal base upon which the 
measures are based; it claimed that the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity 
were not satisfied; it submitted that the contested measures were brought into effect in 
a way which was contrary to the principle of legal certainty; it argued that the 
allocation of certain powers/tasks to the European Commission and EBA was ultra 
vires; it sought to reject the disclosure obligations for infringing principles of data 
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protection and privacy; and it challenged the EU’s requirements by claiming that 
certain provisions had extra-territorial effect.  
The AG disagreed. He was not convinced by the extra-territoriality argument; 
nor did he agree with the argument that the right to privacy and data protection laws 
had been infringed. Regarding the argument that the allocation of tasks to EBA (ie, 
the power to adopt draft technical standards) was ultra vires,6 - a claim which could 
potentially have had a wider impact on EU agency law - the AG rejected the legal 
reasoning which underpinned the UK’s claim. It is worth noting in this context that 
developing draft technical standards is one of EBA’s core tasks. However, they must 
be endorsed by the European Commission in order to be binding and, according to 
EBA’s founding regulation, they cannot involve ‘strategic decisions or policy 
choices’.7 The UK sought to rely on this provision in order to obtain the annulment of 
the CRD IV provision which vests EBA with the task of drafting the standards. But 
the AG found the argument to be odd given that the acts in question (the EBA 
regulation and CRD IV) are in the hierarchy of norms of the same level and nothing 
allowed concluding that one of the acts trumped the other. In any event, the AG did 
not concur with the underlying assumption: that EBA would be required to make 
strategic decisions or policy choices as a result of the provisions of the CRD IV. The 
UK also argued that the provisions in question should be annulled because the EBA 
regulation was based on Article 114(1) TFEU – a common harmonisation basis under 
the Treaty, but which in its second paragraph explicitly states that it cannot be used as 
far as the rights and interests of employed persons are concerned. For the UK the 
point was that EBA, in exercising its powers, would be able to affect such rights and 
interests. But the AG was quick in pointing out that the legal base for establishing an 
agency was irrelevant since what was at issue was a conferral of tasks which could 
well be justified by reference to another legal base. He also pointed out that the 
standards which EBA adopted were ultimately only draft measures and accordingly 
different from the measures envisaged under Article 114 TFEU.  
The AG went on to reject the UK’s argument that the principle of legal 
certainty had been breached and dismissed the claim that the principles of 
proportionality/subsidiarity had been infringed. As regards a subsidiarity breach, the 
Court has traditionally been difficult to persuade. Claiming that proportionality is 
breached can also be difficult to show given the broad discretion which the Court 
affords to the EU legislature in areas which involve political/economic/social choices 
and where complex assessments are required. Arguably, this will often be the case in 
the financial and banking areas, and especially in the present context where the 
answer to the question of how to improve a pre-financial crisis situation regarding 
excessive risk-taking was subject to debate.  
The AG left the most promising claim until the end: i.e., the claim that the 
legal base for adopting Articles 94(1)(g) and 94(2), which are at the heart of the CRD 
IV approach to bonuses, were inadequate. As a reminder, at issue were the rules 
which determine the ratios between the fixed and variable components of the total 
remuneration and EBA’s powers to develop draft technical standards in this context. 
The legal base for the measures is Article 53(1) TFEU, a provision which is aimed at 
facilitating the right of establishment by authorising legislative action to this effect. 
The UK disagreed with the choice of legal base; it contended that Article 153(2) 
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TFEU should have been used, a provision found under the Treaty title on Social 
Policy. This choice was significant since Article 153(5) excludes explicitly action on 
pay under Article 153. The AG disagreed with the UK’s analysis. Regarding Article 
153(5), he agreed that the provision ruled out fixing the level of pay.8 But he argued 
that the effect of the CRD IV remuneration rules was distinctively different: article 
94(1)(g) merely provided for the variable component of the total remuneration to be 
no greater than 100% of the fixed component, or 200% of the fixed component if this 
higher percentage was so authorised. The point was crucial for the AG. As long as no 
limit attached to the fixed component of the remuneration, the ratios did not prevent a 
financial institution from offering any amount by way of bonuses and ultimately any 
amount by way of total remuneration. In short, according to the AG, the rules did not 
establish a limit on the level of pay but merely established a ‘structure for 
remuneration’.9  
Hence, the final blow to the UK’s action came in the form of a technical legal 
argument about the meaning of Article 153(5) TFEU. This brings me back to my 
initial point regarding the way in which a common policy argument, voiced notably 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in order to argue against the EU’s action on 
bonuses, is turned on its head in order to justify EU action. Thus, the argument that 
the CRD IV rules on bonuses would merely push up basic salaries served the AG for 
rejecting the UK’s challenge. For the AG, it meant that that EU legislature did not act 
contrary to Article 153(5) TFEU. In other words, it is because the CRD IV rules do 
not cap bonuses (following the interplay between the fixed and variable components) 
that the CRD IV rules on remuneration do not breach Treaty rules. To be sure, by 
using the argument in a different way, the AG did not question the policy adequacy of 
these rules. However, given the Court’s unwillingness to engage in the context of a 
proportionality assessment with complex policy choices, he did not have to do so at 
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